



The expropriation of land and the misappropriation of lists
in Islamabad
A B S T R A C T
In this article, I investigate the ongoing battle
between villagers on the outskirts of Islamabad,
Pakistan, and the state development agency
attempting to expropriate their land. This battle has
been waged through the medium of documents,
particularly lists, which villagers and colluding
officials have used to defraud the Pakistani
government of the equivalent of millions of dollars.
Through this case study, I develop an approach to
contemporary state governance as material practice,
showing how government discourse is shaped by the
material forms it takes and highlighting the issue of
reference and predication (or how words relate to
things). [governance, documents, state, semiotics,
technology, materiality, South Asia, Pakistan]
B
etween sectors G–11 and G–12 in the Pakistani capital of Islam-
abad, where a four-lane avenue has been planned for decades, a
narrow road has recently replaced an uneven muddy path. This
road marks the battle line between the Pakistani federal govern-
ment and the villagers of Badia Qadir Bakhsh (or, as it is bureau-
cratically designated, BQB), who reject the compensation the government
offers for their expropriated land and houses in the area of the proposed
thoroughfare. On one side, large, marble-faced houses guard the western
front of the city. On the other side, water buffalos lumber among the vil-
lage’s low, sprawling house compounds and patches of wheat.
The city planning and administrative agency, the Capital Development
Authority (CDA), has expropriated “undeveloped” land in western Islam-
abad and paid villagers like those of BQB the equivalent of millions of dol-
lars in compensation. Meanwhile, the villagers continue to occupy the land
and houses for which they have been paid. How does one account for this
stalemate in one of the most highly planned and bureaucratically unified
cities of the South Asian subcontinent? One day in 1998, I put the question
to the special magistrate of the CDA, an elite officer who dealt with build-
ing and commercial regulation. He told me the key was to control “the list,”
that is, the list of property holders entitled to compensation for expropri-
ated land and structures. “Why is the CDA begging for land?” he asked. “If
I were doing this job, I would make a final list and keep it in the custody
of the CDA chairman under lock and key. . . . Every day the list is tampered
with. No one should be allowed to see or tamper with the list.” Surprised
by his answer, I wondered at the importance of this list. And why did the
magistrate emphasize controlling it physically, rather than discursively?
Addressing these questions requires treating governance as a material
practice. In this article, I develop an approach to contemporary state gover-
nance from the perspective of semiotic technologies—ideational and ma-
terial means for producing, interpreting, and regulating significance for
particular ends. I argue that scholars must attend to the material dimen-
sions of bureaucratic semiotic technologies to understand the workings of
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government. The focus on materiality foregrounds the is-
sue of reference and predication, often underemphasized
by discursive approaches to government that focus on clas-
sification schemes, statistics, and rules and pay little atten-
tion to concrete practices by which they are linked to peo-
ple, places, and things.
Fraud in the land-expropriation process constitutes a
challenge to the original vision for the city. Islamabad was
established in 1959 under martial law as a highly planned
administrative city. It was sited on agricultural land several
miles north of Rawalpindi, then a city of several hundred
thousand. Sealed off from the influence of the surrounding
society, Islamabad was to be a bulwark against corruption, a
tool to ensure the political dominance of the bureaucratic–
military government that came to power in a 1958 coup
(Hull in press). A powerful bureaucracy, the CDA was estab-
lished with complete administrative and judicial authority
over planning and development in the city.
The Master Plan for Islamabad, designed by the Greek
modernist planner Costantinos Doxiadis, called for Islam-
abad and Rawalpindi to expand indefinitely on parallel rays
out from their nuclei but to be forever divided by a green
belt, a major transportation artery, and a linear industrial
zone (see Figure 1). This division echoed that between New
Delhi and Old Delhi, a division that represented the rela-
tion of the imperial government to its subject population
and reinforced the social separation of rulers and ruled. In
the Islamabad master plan, a monumental national admin-
istrative area dominated a grid of 1.25-square-mile sectors.
This uncompromising numbered and lettered grid, materi-
Figure 1. Master Plan for the Islamabad Metropolitan Area, 1960. Image first published in Town Planning Review, v. 36, Issue 1, pp. 1–28, 1965, article
by Doxiadis Associates, “Islamabad, Creation of a New Capital.”
alized by roads cutting through hillocks and spanning shal-
low gullies, symbolized the dominance of the government
over even the land itself.
Doxiadis called Islamabad a “dynapolis” (from dynamic
and metropolis) and praised the grid because it could “de-
velop dynamically, unhindered into the future, into space
and time” (Doxiadis Associates 1965:26). However, all did
not go according to plan. The boundless westward expan-
sion envisioned by Doxiadis stalled in the 11-series of sec-
tors, just six miles from the president’s house, at the border
of the village BQB.
In the English-language press and official writings of
the early 1960s, inhabitants of villages such as BQB were re-
ferred to as “displaced persons,” “oustees,” or “evictees”—
premature labels that confidently invoked their future dis-
possession. Today, the official designation for these people
is still “displaced persons.” However, in most official writ-
ings, the English press, and conversation, they are more
commonly called “affectees,” reflecting the fact that they
are affected by planned development but are rarely dis-
placed anymore. The Urdu press, from the beginning more
in touch with the perspective and tactics of the villagers,
has always called them what they call themselves, mu-
tassareen, or “the affected.” The term affectee captures a
whole vision of the relation between government and pop-
ulace. It is applied to a broad range of people whose inter-
ests are negatively affected by the government: shopkeepers
who have to pay a general sales tax, government servants
whose state housing tenure is limited by eligibility policies,
and worshippers who pray beneath the hot summer sun
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because the government has not completed a mosque. The
term is also applied to the victims of droughts and floods.
Government action, like a natural force, is figured as an
overwhelming power wholly external to the people it con-
trols.1 As a term for the villagers tangling with the CDA
today, however, affectee is less accurate than effectee, the
misspelled version one occasionally finds in official writ-
ings and poorly edited English-language newspaper arti-
cles. This oxymoronic term captures the peculiar mix of
agency and subjection that has characterized the owners of
expropriated land in the last decade. For, these disaffected
“effectees” have come to effectively control what the CDA
does to them.
Although affectees have managed to change no laws or
policies, they have established a strong basis from which
to increase their compensation profit from expropriation: a
mass of fraudulent documents. Affectees have gained con-
trol over the production and circulation of the documents
through which regulations and laws are exercised, in Max
Weber’s terms, appropriating (or misappropriating) some of
the means of administration. The fraud illustrates the para-
doxical relationship between government documentation
and corruption.
The problematics of reference and materiality in
government representations
The intervention of Islamabad villagers in the expropria-
tion process suggests the need to adjust the accounts of
governmental technologies that have followed from Michel
Foucault’s treatment of the modern European state. In such
accounts, cartographic, statistical, and other documentary
techniques plunge into sociocultural domains that were
previously crudely known and controlled, to document
and reorganize them. Governmental techniques generate
an aggregate, synoptic view of reality, a schematic knowl-
edge necessary to implement regimes of control. As James
Scott puts it, modern administrative technologies attempt
to “make a society legible” (1998:2) to the government. The
history of Islamabad land expropriation challenges such ac-
counts by presenting a case in which illegibility and opacity
have been produced by the very instruments of legibility.
Backed by authoritarian power and facing little orga-
nized opposition, the modernist schemes Scott describes
are carried out mostly according to plan and run into prob-
lems mainly because of informal processes they ignore.
But, more commonly, the effort to use categories and mea-
suring techniques to create bureaucratic objects—actual
houses and land to be expropriated, displaced persons to
be compensated—is a much more complicated task than
planners envision, one mediated by elaborate documen-
tary practices. Complications arise not only from the infil-
tration of the formal by the informal but also, as Harold
Garfinkel (1967) emphasizes, from the formal procedures
themselves, especially from the translations of official cate-
gories into the operational realm of documentary artifacts.
These translations shape the work done by state categories.
As work on passports has shown, for example, the function-
ing of categories of nation-state membership depends on
how they are translated into documents identifying individ-
uals as members of a particular category (Bowker and Star
1999; Caplan and Torpey 2001; Torpey 2000).
The very term bureaucracy points to a form of gov-
ernance built around a thing, the writing desk, and the
documentary practices it supports. Accounts of bureau-
cracy commonly emphasize norms, rules, informal behav-
ior, and coercive power but not writing, although writing
has long been recognized as central to modern organiza-
tions, the state, in particular. Weber observed that “bureau-
cratic administration means fundamentally domination
through knowledge” (1978:225). He saw the documentation
of rules and facts as a function of writing unique to bureau-
cratic organizations: “The management of the modern of-
fice is based upon written documents (the ‘files’)” (Weber
1978:957). This emphasis on writing as an instrument of
control through the storage and transmission of informa-
tion has continued within much scholarship on states and
other forms of organization (Blau and Meyer 1971; Goody
1986; Yates 1989). Recently, anthropologists have observed
that documents, like other forms of material culture, such
as uniforms, cars, and official buildings, are central to the
everyday representation and, thereby, the reproduction of
states (Das 2004; Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Messick 1993;
Poole 2004; Sharma and Gupta 2006). Aradhana Sharma
and Akhil Gupta, for example, argue that “proceduralism”—
routine, repetitive practices of rule following—and its vio-
lation are central to “how the state comes to be imagined,
encountered, and reimagined by the population” (2006:12).
This emphasis on the broad symbolism of writing and other
bureaucratic practices is a welcome corrective to an exclu-
sive focus on the knowledge function of records.
However, the focus on the normative commitment to
rule following or the aesthetics of form (Riles 2000) can lead
to the view that the specificities of individual documents are
secondary, even unimportant beside their formulaic and
pro forma aspects. Although one should not lose sight of
how documents index the state, attention should be paid
to the way their participation in different projects within
the state arena depends on their variable material qualities,
discourses, and careers. A property document and a gov-
ernment file may inhabit the same world of bureaucratic
inscription, but they circulate differently, gather around
themselves different people and things, and are put to very
different sorts of ends. The significance and function of bu-
reaucratic inscriptions are heterogeneous.
Although the powers of graphic artifacts depend on
their place within a regime of authority and authentica-
tion (Hull 2003), they are not bureaucratic fetishes, simply
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embodiments of social relations in the bureaucratic arena,
idols of statist proceduralism whose qualities can be dis-
solved in a bath of context. As Daniel Miller has argued
within a general theory of culture as objectification, the
“medium of objectification matters” (1987:129). His ac-
count emphasizes artifacts as human creations, but he ar-
gues that their production, distribution, use, and meaning
depend on their properties and are not simply determined
by social factors (Miller 2005). Similarly, Bruno Latour ar-
gues that people lend artifacts properties of themselves in
exchange for properties of the artifacts, a process he calls
“translation.” “We so incessantly recruit and socialize non-
humans . . . not to mirror, congeal, crystallize, or hide so-
cial relations, but to remake these very relations through
fresh and unexpected sources of action” (Latour 1999:197).
Indeed, documents and other artifacts were unexpected
sources of action with which villagers of western Islamabad
remade their relations with the government and the built
environment.
Additionally, too much emphasis on proceduralism can
deflect attention from the problematics of reference at the
center of bureaucratic practices. For Sharma and Gupta,
the importance of “observing the correct bureaucratic rule”
(2006:12) is evidenced by the divergence of documenta-
tion from the reality it purports to represent, as in their ex-
ample of a supervisor accusing a subordinate of cheating
because the subordinate irregularly documented a meet-
ing the supervisor must have known the subordinate, in
fact, attended. But, in accounting for the efficacy of doc-
uments, one does not have to choose between procedu-
ralism and reference. Procedures compel compliance not
because the documents they generate supersede the reali-
ties they purport to represent but because, much like scien-
tific protocols, bureaucratic procedures normatively embed
documents in those realities (Latour 1999:24–79). Although
proceduralist concerns shape the production and use of
all official documents, particular utterances and referential
processes, even when they are compromised, account for
much of the efficacy of individual documents. Bureaucratic
practices have their own logics, concepts, norms, and soci-
ology, but scholars need to account also for how they en-
gage (or do not engage) with people, places, and things to
make bureaucratic objects or, in Annemarie Mol’s terminol-
ogy (2002), for how bureaucratic objects are “enacted” in
practice.
This approach to bureaucratic objects suggests two
shortcomings of Scott’s powerful visual metaphor. First, fig-
uring the state as an observer looking from a singular per-
spective can lead one to assume the unity of state represen-
tations, rather than demonstate how such unity is achieved
(or not) through coordination in practice (Abrams 1988; Li
2005; Mol 2002). I return to this point below. Second, Scott’s
account insightfully demonstrates the importance of classi-
ficatory schemes and conceptual logics employed by state
actors. But the visual metaphor can suggest these concep-
tual schemes and logics are rather flat filters that color the
viewer’s image of the object. The metaphor underplays the
numerous mediations necessary to achieve links between
state representations and the objects they represent.
Accounts of the discursive dimension of governmen-
tal semiotic technologies need to be supplemented with
an understanding of how such technologies work through
material artifacts, particularly through what I call “graphic
artifacts”—files, maps, lists, visiting cards, and so forth. Bu-
reaucratic organizations are, to use Latour’s term, “object
institutions” (1999:192), collectives of people and artifacts,
graphic artifacts, in particular. These collectives are not re-
ducible to sociologically defined coalitions that put artifacts
to use; rather, these collectives are formed in part through
encounters precipitated by artifacts. Although one should
not lose sight of the ideological distinction between the
state and the society it governs (Fuller and Harriss 2001;
Mitchell 1999), the concept of “the collective” can help
gather together people, things, and processes that associate
across a poorly defined border between the state apparatus
and its social surround.
Timothy Mitchell (1999:76–77) rightly warns against
separating the material and discursive forms of states, and
Scott similarly merges the functions of documents and
statistics: “The functionary of any large organization ‘sees’
the human activity that is of interest to him largely through
the simplified approximations of documents and statistics:
tax proceeds, lists of taxpayers, land records, average in-
comes, unemployment numbers, mortality rates, trade and
productivity figures, the total number of cases of cholera
in a certain district” (1998:76–77). However, the material
and discursive aspects of bureaucratic representations pro-
vide different handles for connections with other people
and with things. The agents who engage with bureaucratic
discourses (such as narratives, laws, classification schemes,
and statistics) and the strategies they employ may be very
different from those engaged with the artifactual vehicles
of those discourses. Actors themselves differentiate the dis-
cursive from the material aspects of representations in this
way. As I describe below, owners of expropriated land were
entirely unsuccessful in altering expropriation laws, poli-
cies, and administrative techniques. However, the artifac-
tual basis of legal decisions, policies, and administrative
techniques proved to be a much more permeable domain.
Within the Pakistani bureaucracy is a great variety of
graphic artifacts: files, office registers, minutes, organiza-
tional charts, plans, visiting cards, “chits,” petitions, pow-
ers of attorney, memos, letters, revenue records, regula-
tions, reports, policy statements, and office manuals. There
are some commonalities in the use of and ideological con-
structs related to most of these documentary genres. How-
ever, each genre has its own material form, pattern of
use, discursive characteristics, graphic conventions, and
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interpretive frameworks through which readers produce
and make sense of it. The interpretation and use of most of
these formal genres are governed by an official graphic ide-
ology, elaborated in office manuals. A graphic ideology in-
cludes conventions for the interpretation of graphic forms,
views about how artifacts are or ought to be produced
and circulated, and more general conceptions regarding the
ontology and authority of graphic artifacts (Clanchy 1979;
Derrida 1974; Messick 1993).2 The graphic ideology govern-
ing artifacts in Islamabad strictly regulates the production
and circulation of official documents, views words as corre-
sponding to things, and identifies autographic authorship
with individual agency. This official ideology opens up a
world of different practices that honor it in the breach.
As Charles Peirce (1955:98–119) observed and Webb
Keane (1997, 2003) has recently explored, all signs are ma-
terial and their material properties shape their significa-
tion. The study of governance must attend not only to com-
municative practices but also to the social life of things
(Appadurai 1986; Kopytoff 1986). In Islamabad, graphic ar-
tifacts are not only written and read but they are also dupli-
cated, bound to other artifacts, supplemented, fabricated,
defaced, and burned. They are circulated, delayed, locked
up, stored, misplaced, lost, forgotten, stolen, and bought.
Such events in the social career of artifacts shape the social
organization of communication and, thereby, the outcome
of events. For example, the career of a file, especially its path
of circulation, is often more decisive to a case than the or-
ganizational hierarchy that is supposed to judge its merits
(Hull 2003).
Although the material characteristics of documenta-
tion always shape its function (Chartier 1995; Latour 1990;
Pellegram 1998; Riles 2000; Torpey 2000), the colonial his-
tory of government in South Asia and the genres of records
in use make the materiality of records especially salient
in places such as Islamabad. Contemporary South Asian
bureaucracies are the successors of the Kaghazi Raj, or
Document Rule of the British colonial administration, an
administration built on two kinds of distrust. First, the di-
rectors of the English East India Company in London dis-
trusted their faraway agents, who routinely served their
own interests alongside or even through their work for the
company (Hejeebu 2005; Marshall 1976). Likewise, colonial
traders and administrators recognized that Indian func-
tionaries were often more committed to their own interests
and social institutions than to the company or govern-
ment. British officers in India were frequently transferred
among different posts. They lacked knowledge of the lo-
cales they administered and of the permanently posted na-
tive functionaries on whom they helplessly depended. In
response to these uncertain loyalties, the British, build-
ing on the elaborate written procedures of the Mughals
and nascent European commercial practices, fashioned a
graphic regime of surveillance and control. This solution
took form within the horizon of the empiricist metaphysics
prevalent in Britain: a practical attack on the problem of
words and things, an attempt to make discourse part of
a more trustworthy material order.3 Of course, compara-
ble documentary techniques have been underpinned by
different ontologies in South Asia and elsewhere (Bedos-
Rezak 2000; Connery 1998; Lewis 1999). It was precisely
the materiality of graphic signs that made them useful as
a palpable sedimentation of the real. Official discourse was
anchored in people, places, times, and artifacts through
an elaborate use of signatures, dates, and stamps. Offi-
cials transferred from London often noted that the In-
dian colonial government used written documentation far
more extensively than its metropolitan counterpart did
(Government of India, Secretariat Procedures Committee
1963, a reissue of a 1920 report). Normative procedures
were laid down in hundreds of manuals produced for every
sphere of administration in the late 19th century (Saumarez
Smith 1985). In much the same fashion, the successors
of these manuals define procedures in contemporary Pak-
istani bureaucracies.
But this regime does not always supply the certitude
and stability it promises. An 18th-century Yemeni com-
mentator, writing in a Muslim metaphysical tradition that
placed more stock in spirit than matter, saw the problem
clearly.
As for the falseness of the position of him who holds
for the valuation of documents without restraint, this is
obvious. Because if the door of unlimited acceptance of
them were opened, the wealth of the community would
be lost and people’s possessions would be removed
from the permanence and security of their hands. In
this position there is immoderation and a disdain for
principles, because any claimant can make for himself
what he wants in the way of documents, proceeding
with craft and skill in reproducing the papers he thinks
will advance his circumstances. [Messick 1993:212]
This commentary points to the bureaucratic irony that
dependence on written artifacts to secure fixity can result
in the opposite effect. Crucially, the basis for insecurity the
commentary identifies is not only falsity (referentially in-
correct representation) but also the manipulation of arti-
facts. Following this insight, I describe the fraud endemic to
the Islamabad expropriation process as an illicit production
and circulation of things, showing that this fraud is less like
lying and more like the theft or forgery and sale of a paint-
ing, a material intervention in discourse.
Graphic artifacts as representations do not live apart
from a represented realm. They are entangled with the peo-
ple, places, events, and other artifacts they represent. This
is especially clear in the Islamabad expropriation process.
The paper regime the British designed to hermetically seal
the bureaucracy never worked as planned (e.g., Hejeebu
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2005; Khan 1866; Misra 1977), despite the nostalgia for the
incorruptible Raj one sometimes finds among Islamabad
bureaucrats. But the traffic in and out of the CDA is cer-
tainly brisk. Far from remaining in desks and file cabinets,
graphic artifacts are now crucial mediators of the engage-
ment of the government and populace, shaping settlement
patterns, social networks, political cleavages within villages,
and financial compensation.
Early planning and failed opposition
On the original planning maps for Islamabad (e.g., Figure 1),
the squares of sectors are empty white spaces, and early
documents describe the site for the new city as “open land,”
but officials were well aware that over 54,000 villagers in-
habited the area of the future capital (Federal Capital Com-
mission 1960:12). Early plans envisioned preserving some
of the villages located on the periphery of the area to be de-
veloped, as “tokens of traditional village life.”4 Most of the
villages, however, lay within the grid of sectors and were to
be removed. One official wrote regretfully, “While it is not a
pleasant job to throw people from their houses or land, we
have to do it in the larger public interest of establishing Is-
lamabad.”
Under the CDA Ordinance, executed under Martial Law
Regulation 82 of 1960 (MLR 82), owners of expropriated
land were paid the average 1954–58 market price for their
land, plus 15 percent for compulsory acquisition. Compen-
sation for built structures, “built-up property” (or BUP),
was similarly based on average 1954–58 market sales us-
ing a formula that included square footage of the struc-
ture and quality of construction. Later, these rates were
augmented to offset monetary inflation, but the base rate
was frozen at 1958 levels. Under this regulation, compen-
sation for land and houses was effectively fixed at the rate
a farmer or sheepherder might have paid for them in the
1950s, although eventually it would be not farmers but in-
vestors and tycoons of various sorts who would buy the land
from the government at high rates for construction of large
houses and commercial plazas. This was all according to
plan. The fixed rate of compensation was intended to pre-
vent a speculation market from developing, which would
slow construction and drive up development costs for the
CDA. More importantly, as the government saw it, the ben-
efits of government actions should accrue to government.
If land prices went up as a result of the development of
the capital, then the government, rather than “individuals,”
should earn the profit (Federal Capital Commission 1960).
For the CDA, this was not only just but also financially nec-
essary, as the funds raised from the sale of developed plots
would finance future developments.
Under the same expropriation law, new construction
on land publicly designated for expropriation was banned.
The CDA relaxed the enforcement of this law in a grow-
ing number of cases in which only part of the land was ac-
quired, leaving a substantial portion to be looked after by
owners. But the ban was rigidly enforced on wholly acquired
lands. In 1965, five men were sentenced to a year in prison
for the construction of new houses on land acquired by the
CDA.
Many villagers were unwilling to part with ancestral
land. In conversations with me in 1997, Raja Zahoor Ahmed,
numberdar (lit. keeper of numbers, or official headman) of
Sheikhpur, a village yet to be possessed that spread over
sectors I–14, I–15, and I–16, said that residents, especially
elders, were devastated by the news that they would have
to move. Retelling a story that has entered the folklore of
the expropriation process, he claimed that four or five el-
ders died from the shock. “They loved the land. Their ances-
tors had cultivated the land with such effort—now there are
tractors, but in those days it was all done by hand and with
plows and bullocks. And this land was the source of their
honor.” A long-standing rural vision of the city as a place of
alien and immoral ways fueled villagers’ anxieties that they
would be duped out of their money and perhaps corrupted
as well. Other reasons for their opposition to surrendering
their land were more economic. CDA rates of compensation
were often below market rates prevailing in the late 1950s,
because the sales on which the average market values were
calculated included a large number of transfers within fam-
ilies at low, nonmarket rates. Moreover, if they declined to
farm agricultural plots granted to them elsewhere, most vil-
lagers would have had trouble finding another source of in-
come.5 As uneducated farmers, they would have had dif-
ficulty making a livelihood from the new business of the
region, government. Nevertheless, villagers inhabiting ar-
eas affected by the early phases of development left their
houses and lands peacefully in the face of bulldozers.
Although associations of affectees proudly professed
their willingness to sacrifice for the new national capital,
they often criticized the expropriation process as a grand
scheme to take land at low rates from the poor for the ben-
efit of well-placed government officials and the wealthy. In
1970, a spokesman for a group of affectees demanded that
“acquisition should not be made for allotments later to cap-
italists” (Nawa-i-Waqt 1970). At a meeting of the Associa-
tion for Islamabad Displaced Persons in 1977, the head of
the organization demanded that “land should not be ac-
quired for forests, clubs, race courses, golf courses and for
favoring the rich and bureaucracy.” In public discourse and
conversation, villagers characterized the whole process as a
cruel injustice (zulum).
However, some villagers eagerly took the cash the gov-
ernment offered them and quit their land. Although the
Punjab is known to have some of the richest agricultural soil
in South Asia, the land in the Islamabad area is rocky and
yields a poor crop. In the early 1960s, few thought that the
government would make a go of the new capital and that
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their land would someday be worth millions. Through the
mid-1960s, the name Islamabad was embraced by doubt-
ful quotation marks even in Rawalpindi newspapers. Ac-
cording to one official, some residents approached the CDA
and requested that their land be expropriated. When they
were told that the government had not yet allocated funds
to acquire their land, they insisted that the CDA take it
immediately and pay them whenever the financing came
through. After giving up their land, many former male res-
idents could be seen stepping out in Rawalpindi dressed in
fancy clothes and gold-embroidered Kohati sandals, driving
cars or new horse carts. Some gambled away their finan-
cial awards. Others who were thriftier bought land, a long-
standing use for surplus funds in rural Punjab.
Those opposed to expropriation or to the specific com-
pensation awarded, however, had little recourse. Under
martial law, the CDA could not be challenged politically.
There were also no legal options. MLR 82 declared that regu-
lations made under its broad provisions overrode any other
existing law or contract and explicitly banned recourse to
any court, including the Supreme Court. Paragraph 49E of
the CDA Ordinance, buttressed by MLR 82, also explicitly
denied court jurisdiction in disputes with the CDA over any
matter, including expropriation and compensation. Under
the populist government of Zulifikhar Ali Bhutto in the early
1970s, courts began to accept petitions from villagers. In
numerous legal cases against the CDA expropriation laws
in the 1970s and early 1980s, affectees invoked the rights
of sons of the soil, the just-price ethics of the market, and
the Quranic injunction never to compel a sale. However, ex-
cept in a few cases that turned on technical aspects of the
expropriation process, courts found against these petitions.
Although the legal basis for courts to hear these cases was
shaky, the CDA law was clear regarding the CDA’s powers of
expropriation and requirements for compensation.
In very different kinds of disputes over land in Brazil,
described by James Holston (1991), and in postsocialist Ro-
mania, described by Katherine Verdery (1996, 2003), most
of the conflict centered on the role of law in defining cat-
egories and systems of meaning. In those cases, categories
defined by different laws conflicted; different laws were em-
bedded in different historical narratives of the individual
holdings and the polity. In contrast, the martial law and
CDA regulations of Islamabad are paragons of clarity and
simplicity; no court rulings have involved significant re-
interpretation of these laws. However, contention over the
evidentiary artifacts required to implement these laws has
been as productive of conflict and irresolution as in Brazil
and Romania.
Shifting houses and dummy houses
In this section and the next, I describe how, through the
1980s and 1990s, affectees were able to intervene in increas-
ingly sophisticated ways at later and later stages of the refer-
ential practices (Hanks 1990) through which compensation
records were generated. My narrative begins, as affectees
began, with the initial material referents in the chains of
documentation leading to compensation checks: houses.
Money for fancy duds, gambling, or the purchase of more
land was not the only reason some villagers were eager for
expropriation. Early on, there were indications that “ous-
tees” were, as one official wrote, “shifting to adjoining areas
unauthorisedly.” By the mid-1960s, officials were already
concerned that the expropriation process had changed the
dynamics of settlement in the area. Officials noted that mud
huts were springing up at night like mushrooms north and
west of the city. In 1971, a CDA representative, in response
to complaints about CDA efforts to evict residents of one
village without compensation, claimed that half the pop-
ulation “consisted of itinerant villagers who had flocked
to the area in hope of getting compensation money and
other privileges intended for bonafide displaced persons”
(Pakistan Times 1971).
The CDA itself inadvertently promoted this process by
allowing oustees to buy the building materials (malba) of
their demolished houses for 15 percent of the house value.
The original objective of this policy was to help displaced
persons build houses elsewhere at no financial cost to the
CDA. In explaining why this policy of selling the building
materials was reversed in 1989, the head of the Lands Di-
rectorate within the CDA wrote that the “selling of malba
invariably resulted in the issuance of a fresh lease for ex-
ploiting the Authority as the malba was conveniently trans-
ported a little distance away and the new houses used to be
built with old material which was sufficient evidence to sup-
port false claims.” Today, the hodgepodge of brick houses
faced with concrete gives BQB the look of an old village ren-
ovated by the affluence that has come to the area in the
wake of the establishment of the capital. In fact, most of
the structures are less than 20 years old. The original vil-
lage straddled sectors G–11 and G–12 (see Figure 2). Ac-
cording to CDA records, 263 acres of BQB land lying in
G–11/1 and G–11/2 were acquired in 1969, with compen-
sation following two years later. The built-up property on
this land, 97 houses, was legally acquired by the CDA more
than six years later, in 1975, the compensation award for
which came nearly a decade later, in 1984, in the form of
money and 109 plots in I–10/1. Through the mid-1970s, the
31 acres of BQB lying in G–12 was mostly occupied by struc-
tures (baiteks) used for entertaining guests and travelers on
their way from Rawalpindi to the popular shrine of Golra
Sharif to the north. Before the CDA took possession of the
G–11 land, residents there began to move across the border
into G–12, converting the hospitality structures into their
primary residences, becoming guests of themselves on their
own land. Others who did not have such structures in G–12
built new houses there in violation of the fraying CDA ban
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Figure 2. The village of Badia Qadir Bakhsh as it straddled sectors G–11
and G–12 before expropriation.
on construction in areas designated for expropriation. After
building their houses anew, they simply waited to profit
from another expropriation. One CDA official I talked with
likened the CDA effort to rolling up a carpet.
This resettlement tactic of villagers was inadvertently
promoted by the disjuncture between two kinds of land-
reckoning systems used by different organizational divi-
sions of the CDA. Although people generally know that all
the land of the region will eventually be expropriated, by law
compulsory land acquisitions have to be made under some
definite development scheme. Determination of which land
is to be acquired in any particular proceeding is made by
the Planning Wing of the CDA, which plans by sector. Offi-
cials of the Planning Wing submit requests to the Lands Di-
rectorate, which then determines who owns the land falling
in a particular sector and what built structures exist on it.
Through the chairman of the CDA, the district commis-
sioner of the CDA (DC–CDA), an official with special ju-
dicial powers within the larger administrative structure of
the Pakistani state, is directed to acquire these lands and to
award compensation.
Planners, viewing the city in terms of land area and
topography, rely on survey maps produced by modern
transit–stadia measurements using metric-system units
and organized by the areal division of the sector. Although
the field notes of surveyors are usually recorded in Urdu,
the notations on the survey maps as well as accompany-
ing documentation are in English. In contrast, the Lands
Directorate uses the revenue record, the landholding sys-
tem of great complexity developed by the British from a
Mughal system (Baden-Powell 1892; Saumarez Smith 1996).
This record is written in Urdu (CDA functionaries often
called it the “Urdu list”) and uses the areal divisions of vil-
lage or revenue estate (mauzah); plot (khasra), measured
in units of acres; one-eighth of an acre (kanal); and 50
square feet (marla). Village-level revenue staff (patwaris)
measure holdings using chains (and sometimes pacing) and
landmarks. They keep village records on scrolls of cloth on
which they sketch the property shape in black or blue pen
and record the ownership, tenure, and size of the holding.
As the records are organized around individual landhold-
ings for taxation purposes, they do not readily or accurately
offer the synoptic areal perspective of the planning maps.
Revenue maps (naqshas) are made by tracing the individual
plot shapes from the scroll onto white paper, so the revenue
map is a haphazard assemblage of the shapes drawn on the
scroll.
Survey maps and revenue maps are not incommen-
surable but uncommensurated, because the practices that
generate them include no common elements. To overcome
this problem, CDA surveyors add something to the land-
scape that can be shared by the two practices: a concrete
pillar sunk into the ground that can be located on both
maps. This pillar translates between the maps to determine
which land and built-up property have to be acquired un-
der a given acquisition directive. Although erecting a pillar
is not usually a problem, in Sheikhpur, a village that spans
sectors I–14, I–15, and I–16, villagers physically threatened
surveyors, refusing to allow pillars to be established, and
the police would not come to force the issue.6 After mak-
ing their measurements, the CDA surveyors could osten-
sively have referenced which lands and built-up property in
the village were to be acquired under acquisition directives
for I–14. Without sinking markers, however, they could not
legally determine which holdings these were on the basis of
the revenue map. Similarly, CDA officials could not prohibit
new construction in the village because the location of the
structures could not be legally established. The villagers af-
fected the legal discourse about their houses by controlling
the artifacts necessary for its production.
Functionaries in both the planning and acquisitions
divisions of the CDA know something about both land-
reckoning systems, but expertise is not evenly distributed.
The Planning Wing employs its own revenue-record spe-
cialists to deal with problems blending planning and own-
ership of undeveloped land. Frustrated in my early attempts
to understand the technicalities of the revenue records, I ac-
quired a copy of the Urdu-language manual for training rev-
enue staff. When I mentioned this to officials in the Plan-
ning Wing, several asked me to make them copies, eager to
be free of dependence on their subordinates’ command of
this system.
In normal operations, each land-reckoning system is
used by different CDA organizational divisions, so discrep-
ancies are never even noted. In fact, the problem of recon-
ciling the two systems was pointed out to me not by a CDA
planner or acquisition official but by a private town planner
who worked for housing societies, organizations that must
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both acquire and plan their developments and, therefore,
must square revenue and survey records. “The physical sur-
vey never co-ordinates with the patwari [revenue official]
records,” he explained. “You cannot fit khasras [plots] in the
master plan survey. When you superimpose the [revenue]
map with the survey, they never coincide. For example, the
patwari says a [plot] is 500 kanals, the survey shows it is 450
kanals . . . it is almost always a decrease because the pat-
wari measures by walking on undulating land . . . sometimes
they even walk over little piles of dirt.” Like the length of the
British coast (Mandelbrot 1967), the size of a landholding
varies with the size of the unit of measure—the smaller the
unit, the larger the holding. Furthermore, graphic represen-
tations of plots can diverge from their numerical represen-
tations. For example, a 20-kanal plot may be represented
on the khasra map as larger than a 25-kanal plot. With
this insight, I coordinated acquisition records and planning
records for several sectors and concluded the CDA also usu-
ally acquires more land than it receives. None of the offi-
cials in the Lands Directorate and the Planning Wing whom
I questioned about this discrepancy were concerned—or
should have been.
If one is tempted by Foucault’s image of the modern
state as a panopticon, this disjuncture between two land-
reckoning systems within the same bureaucratic organiza-
tion should give pause. Here, rather than one, there are two
observers in the tower and the prisoners know that these
observers are not looking at them the same way. Further-
more, as Latour argues, many mediations are necessary to
construct a representation with credible claims to com-
mand a wide field. Latour’s counterimage of the “oligopti-
con” is much more appropriate here: an organization em-
ploying multiple techniques with limited and particular
visions (Latour and Hermant 1998). Latour points out what
most bureaucrats understand: Administrative techniques
do not all converge in a unified set of representations. They
generate ensembles of artifacts of limited and differing per-
spectives that are often very difficult to commensurate. The
residents of expropriated land also understand this quite
well. Those in Sheikhpur defy the CDA by controlling the
mediating artifacts (pillars) necessary to generate legal rep-
resentations for expropriation proceedings. Those of BQB
exploit the disjuncture between the two systems: Whereas
the CDA acquired land by sector, they resettled by revenue
estate (mauzah).7
But more than simply resettlement is going on in vil-
lages like BQB. For reasons I describe in more detail be-
low, population and house figures are hard to come by and
are highly contested. The 1972 Census of BQB counted 68
households holding a population of 425. A federal govern-
ment survey conducted in 1985 put the population of BQB
at 183, suggesting that a substantial portion of residents
had left after the CDA took possession of their land in G–
11 (Capital Development Authority 1985). The 1985 govern-
ment survey was the last one conducted before such in-
formation gathering became a highly contentious activity.
However, Shehla Parveen Shamil and Roohi Sadiq gained
broad access to the village in 1986 for their anthropology
master’s-degree research at Quaid-i-Azam University. Ac-
cording to their survey, BQB had 387 residents, in 50 “fam-
ilies” or households (Shamil 1987:29), a striking increase in
just a couple of years. Shamil and Sadiq wrote that, of these
50 households, only 19 were “joint families,” in which adult
brothers do not divide ownership of residential property.
Residents told them that separate houses for nuclear fami-
lies began to be built in the early 1980s under pressure from
daughters-in-law, common figures of subjection in South
Asian kinship arrangements. However, it is likely that the
CDA policy of compensating on the basis of built-up prop-
erty occupied by a “family unit,” a term that has entered
the common vocabulary of Urdu- and Punjabi-speaking vil-
lagers, played a significant role in this change of residential
arrangements. According to Sadiq (1987), residents of BQB
upheld the status and propriety of the village by refusing to
allow members of lower castes to settle there. They seem
to have been much more welcoming of fictitious residents.
Natural increase and even the most thorough division of
joint family holdings cannot account for the fact that, by
1993, 663 more affectees of BQB had established the right
to compensation for built-up property.8
Many of the claims for built-up property have been
made on the basis of what CDA officials call “dummy
houses,” houses built not to be lived in but to be counted. As
one CDA official testified, many of these houses “came up
suddenly over-night” when the process of marking houses
was begun. Although some of these houses are brick, they
are more commonly short structures with walls of clay or
a mix of stones and clay, no floors, and no roofs or, at most,
“roofs” consisting of a few iron bars supporting some bricks.
If they exist, doors and windows are usually broken and
made of narrow strips of rotten wood.
For these cheaply built houses, “owners” would re-
ceive hundreds of thousands of rupees in compensation,
which was sometimes regretted as bitterly as it was strug-
gled for. One village resident involved in such schemes
lamented to me that the CDA made a thief of him: “The
CDA did not give us our rights so we were helpless, we
had to do this dishonest work . . . if the CDA had given us
our rights, then outsiders could not have come in and got-
ten involved.” The prospect of such a high return on in-
vestment attracted many people from outside the village
to join affectees as investors or brokers in these schemes.
In the early 1990s, a property dealer operating in E–12 of-
fered a friend of mine a chance to build a house there. The
dealer took him out to the area of his “dream house” ac-
companied by the contractor who would build it. Although
compensation for the structure’s expropriation would de-
pend on CDA policies, which change, the dealer offered to
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have a one-room house built for Rs. 4,000–5,000, to earn
an eventual estimated return of Rs. 300,000 (then about
$7,200), or a three-room house for Rs. 10,000–12,000, to re-
turn as much as Rs. 800,000 (about $20,000). Unlike rou-
tine systems of illegal payments (e.g., Parry 2000; Wade
1982), these kinds of deals were entrepreneurial ventures
promising large gross returns, over 60 times the investment,
from which the dealer, CDA functionaries, and villagers who
would vouch for an individual’s residence could be easily
paid off. One CDA official even made his own son the owner
of a dummy house. An assistant in the Lands Directorate
who had extensive knowledge of BQB claimed that many
of the owners of such structures there have used the com-
pensation they have received so far to purchase houses in
the developed sector of G–11. They have installed their ser-
vants in their dummy houses and plan to eject them when
the full compensation is awarded.
Dummy-house schemes have been helped by the diffi-
culty of applying any definition of a house to actual houses
in rural Punjab. Residential structures in rural Punjab usu-
ally consist of at least two rooms giving onto a courtyard
with a stove or cooking area to one side. If grown male
relatives with families occupy the same residence, each
family will tend to have predominant use of one or more
rooms. One of the rooms in the houses of poorer villagers
will be used as a sitting room for receiving guests. Wealth-
ier villagers more concerned about observing purdah, like
many inhabitants of BQB, may also have a one- or two-
room structure entirely independent of their residential
compound for this purpose. This combination of physical
structure and kinship patterns has created problems for
CDA compensation policies. CDA compensation for built-
up property is awarded to a “family unit,” defined in 1984
as a bureaucratic entity combining kinship and a material
structure: “husband/wife and dependent children or sin-
gle person owning a separate independent house” (Capital
Development Authority 1984). Given the ambiguous rela-
tionship between physical structure and settlement of kin
units, the CDA, like its British colonial predecessors (Glover
2008:38), has never been able to work out a formal defini-
tion of the house for compensation purposes, in terms of ei-
ther kinship or physical structure.9 In the early period of ac-
quisitions, this was less of a problem, because what is now
called a “joint family” (father, mother, and brothers with or
without wives and children) occupying a single compound
was the norm and compensation was made on this basis.
In the mid-1980s, as nuclear families occupying indepen-
dent compounds became more common—partly as a way
to increase compensation—heads of nuclear families living
together in one compound began to claim that one house
is actually many, because each room has a “family unit” liv-
ing in it. This drove the CDA to recognize even single rooms
as “houses,” which promoted vigorous building. In light of
these problems, in 1996, the CDA ejected the house as a ba-
sis for delineating the “family unit,” which was redefined in
purely kinship terms.10
Demolition certificates, files, and lists
Although the dummy-house schemes had been successful,
affectees and their partners in the bureaucracy soon real-
ized that all the shoddy building was unnecessary. They did
not have to be concerned with the referents of records but
could go straight to the records themselves to secure com-
pensation. Furthermore, the direct engagement of village
leaders with records gave them even greater influence as es-
sential points on the path of various graphic artifacts neces-
sary to the business of profiting from compensation.
Village leaders, the heads of families that have domi-
nated villages for a century and a half or more, recognize
that their political authority is embedded in their current
settlements. As one leader from BQB told me, “The CDA
can give us land, houses, and money, but who will make
us the leader [khan]? Who will put the turban [pagari] on
our heads?” This same concern was articulated by the Mah-
bood Ilahi, the headman of BQB before the capital was es-
tablished: “As long as I have the land, I will be number-
dar.” However, it is not the land but the process of ex-
propriating land that has given these local leaders a new
lease on power. It is one of the many ironies of Islamabad
that this modernization project has strengthened the so-
called traditional leaders it aimed to supersede.11 In con-
trast to Lesotho, as described by James Ferguson (1994),
state practices are extended but not state power. Accord-
ing to Sadiq, even in 1986, fewer than half of the men in
BQB still farmed as a primary occupation; more than half
of the men (46 of 83) were employed outside the village
in the government and construction, giving them indepen-
dence from village society even as they were brought un-
der the influence of different authorities beyond the vil-
lage. Such a trend would likely have continued even if the
village had remained undisturbed by expropriation mea-
sures. Now, however, the village leaders represent impor-
tant village-based interests of residents to the bureaucracy.
Village leaders eagerly reproduce the paternalistic modern-
ization discourse on the ignorance and childishness of vil-
lagers. In contrast, to defend their efforts to bypass leaders
and deal directly with individual villagers, government bu-
reaucrats highlight the knowledge and savvy of these same
villagers.
In one dramatic incident in 1988, affectees gathered
at the CDA offices to protest the slow processing of their
claims. One official’s file narrative of the event goes as fol-
lows:12 A “procession of affectees” came to see the chair-
man. He was not “on his seat,” so they went to see
Reza Sajjad, the member of the CDA board who oversees
land acquisitions.13 The affectees demanded that he with-
draw the appeals the CDA had filed against a particular
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compensation award. Sajjad said he could do nothing him-
self. Then, according to the file, the
Mob got furious and inflicted injuries on the person
of Member (P) [Member, Planning, i.e., Sajjad] by ev-
ery thing whatever they got in the room i.e. Flower Pot,
Stainless Steel Trays, Table Glass, Chairs, and tools like
sicle [sic]. Member (P) was badly hurt and ran out of
his room to save his life. Member (P) came out of CDA
Sectt. Building by cutting open the wire gauze of the
window of the room of Member (F) and thus saved him
[sic] from inflictions of further injuries of the Mob.
Sajjad was in intensive care for a week. Subsequently,
“the Mob wrecked office of Dir. Rehab [the head of the Re-
habilitation Directorate],” who had already fled, and tried
to steal office files. The mob then attacked the deputy di-
rector of Rehabilitation, after smashing in his locked office
door. The “free for all” at Rehabilitation lasted an hour, and
then the angry affectees were off to the Lands Directorate
offices, where they used “rude unparliamentary language.”
Officials there had fled, but the offices were destroyed. The
account concludes that the mob also made off with records.
As I discuss below, there is more to this story and to Sajjad’s
role as victim.
Since that violent episode, affectees and their col-
leagues have established more routine methods of obtain-
ing and even fabricating records. Some of these leaders and
their assistants, “approach-walas,” as one of their group
called them, spend the entire day at the CDA offices or in the
courts.14 Zahoor, the headman of Sheikpur, joked that he
arrives before government employees and leaves after they
do, even though no one makes him sign a daily attendance
log—one reason many CDA employees turn up at the office
with some regularity. The approach-walas sit in the offices
of any officers who will receive them and cultivate relation-
ships with clerks and peons (runners), who are informed
about meetings among officers and, especially, about the
movement of files. The efforts of approach-walas and bro-
kers to develop networks within the CDA have been aided
by a CDA recruitment policy aimed at the “rehabilitation” of
displaced persons. Despite federal rules requiring that posts
within the CDA be filled from a “surplus pool” (a group of
people with the status but not the work position of em-
ployees of the federal government), the CDA gave prefer-
ence to affectees in the hiring of lower staff from the 1960s
through the end of the 1970s. This was an early conces-
sion to a demand of affectees that could be satisfied at little
cost. From the list of displaced persons maintained by the
Establishment Section of the Federal Secretariat, the CDA
hired hundreds, perhaps thousands, of clerks, drivers, pe-
ons, guards, and sweepers. Over the years, many of these
people have risen from driver or peon to lower-division
clerk or from lower-division clerk to upper-division clerk
or even assistant. Even those who remain at the bottom
are well informed of daily goings-on within the CDA.15 For
many such CDA staff employees, the pecuniary motives that
make them open to traffic in information and artifacts are
augmented by sympathy.
The head of the department in charge of land acquisi-
tions estimated to me in 1998 that an astonishing 95 per-
cent of the original files dealing with expropriation cases
were in the possession of people outside the bureaucracy,
who brought them in to CDA offices whenever any work
was to be done on them, sometimes at the request of CDA
staff whose superior called for them. Such people thus be-
came virtual extensions of the office bureaucracy. The pos-
sessors of files removed papers that recorded denials of or
objections to compensation claims and added documents
supporting claims, with signatures forged or paid for. Sev-
eral officials alleged that a forgery racket operated through
at least the early 1990s that specialized in the signatures of
all the CDA officials involved in the compensation proceed-
ings. Brokers were often better informed of the movement
of files and the progress of cases than the officers respon-
sible for them. One senior official in the Lands Directorate
complained to me that, sometimes, affectees and brokers
came into his office to push their cases and inform him that
their files were sitting on his desk—before he had even had
a chance to review them.
The BQB fraud illustrates the power of this control over
the modest artifacts of the compensation process. Once lib-
erated from their houses, affectees and their bureaucratic
partners began to work on artifacts with a more and more
mediated relationship to the houses they were supposed to
represent, a movement not from the real to the representa-
tion or from word to thing, but from one thing to another.
The paper artifacts were more easily manipulated than
houses and enabled the fraud schemes to vastly increase
in scale during what one official described to me as a pe-
riod of “lust and plunder” from 1987 to 1993. At the heart
of the new schemes were “proformae,” or surrender certifi-
cates documenting that houses of a certain size owned by
certain persons had been surrendered and demolished. The
central government figure in the fraud was none other than
Sajjad, then the CDA board member in charge of the Plan-
ning Wing, the official who was attacked by the mob.16 He
had formed an alliance with the CDA district commissioner,
who had judicial powers to review and amend the compen-
sation awards submitted by the Lands Directorate. Sajjad
also brought in a group of fellow officials from the province
of Sindh to staff the middle ranks of the Lands Directorate:
an assistant director, technical (ADT), and several subengi-
neers, whose job it was to gather information and produce
documentation on built-up property.
In 1987, 1988, and 1990, the DC–CDA claimed to have
heard 1,071 compensation review petitions and to have di-
rected the technical staff to go out to the sites to verify the
veracity of the claims. Whether the technical staff looked at
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any house sites is unclear, but they certainly did the paper-
work: hundreds of fraudulent demolition certificates were
produced. Several CDA functionaries I spoke with alleged
that the “owners” of the demolished houses paid the ADT
Rs. 10,000 for each certificate. Sajjad ensured that these cer-
tificates would not be challenged by diverting files from
their normal paths through the organization hierarchy, ef-
fectively altering the control of the expropriation process.
He “marked” files (i.e., gave written orders for their transfer)
directly to the DC–CDA and ADT, and they sent their files to
him, bypassing the senior officers of the Lands Directorate,
who would normally have signed these files but who were
outside the collusive circle.
On the basis of the demolition certificates, the ADT
then produced compensation lists and submitted them to
the DC–CDA. Many of the petitioners were not owners of
land in BQB. No petitions from the supposed petitioners
were submitted to the CDA, and no separate files for in-
dividual cases were opened. Most houses acquired before
1988 had been documented to be less than 1,000 square feet
in area, and nearly all were less than 2,000 square feet; in
sharp contrast, the new certificates showed the demolished
houses to have been between 2,000 and 5,000 square feet.
According to the dates on the certificates, a single bulldozer
on two separate busy days demolished over 700 houses.
The ADT’s list alone would have been sufficient grounds
for the DC–CDA to make the awards. It seems likely that
the only reason the surrender certificates were fabricated is
that they had to be presented to the officials disbursing the
compensation funds. The surrender certificates themselves
had a convenient autonomy, because they testified that the
owners of demolished structures had bought and removed
the building materials—leaving no traces of the dwellings.
Thus, these certified records were, by their own testimony,
factually unverifiable, their referents no longer existing!
On the basis of these surrender certificates, the DC–
CDA accepted 747 of the 1,071 claims. Most of the claims
were probably bogus, so the reason he rejected some of
them is unclear. Perhaps he was trying to make the review
process appear authentic, or perhaps some of the house
“owners” did not meet his price. The scheme was clearly in
the financial interest of all parties, but the alliance showed
strains at times, most evidently in the attack on Sajjad by his
partners, described above. Sajjad might have been forced to
support a review of the lists suggested by a subordinate or
superior. Alternatively, he might have been slow to deliver
on his promises of compensation (for which the affectees
had already paid) or he might have made further demands
on the affectees before disbursing the compensation funds.
Funds equivalent to millions of dollars were disbursed, al-
though affectees remained on their land to demand more.
However, as the special magistrate I talked with ob-
served, the most vexing artifacts for CDA officials trying to
curb fraud have been the lists of affectees and their houses.
Understanding why requires examining their specific char-
acteristics as a graphic genre. Jack Goody argues that, in
written lists, isolated linguistic units are ordered outside the
frame of a sentence, “where they appear in a very different
and highly ‘abstract’ context,” a process he calls “decontex-
tualization” (1977:78). Goody is interested in what he con-
siders the cognitive consequences of this decontextualiza-
tion. However, his observation can be recast in more pre-
cise sociological and linguistic terms to understand how the
place of lists in discursive and artifactual contexts shapes
their role.
Lists of compensation for built-up property included
the name of the claimant, the location of the property, the
house number, the size of the structure, the quality clas-
sification of the structure, and the rupee amount to be
awarded. As discrete artifacts, these lists were linguistically
divorced from the oral and written propositional discourse
that asserted their factuality. Most CDA genres are anchored
in the human, spatiotemporal, and artifactual orders of the
CDA by elaborate use of signatures, dates, stamps, and in-
terartifactual references (Hull 2003). In contrast, the lists
submitted by the Lands Directorate for execution by the
DC–CDA were inscribed with almost none of these indexes
of context. The space of the paper was no match for the
great volume of activity and artifacts that was supposed to
attest to the validity of every entry on the list. According
to official procedures, the lists were to be compiled by ju-
nior officers after consulting the supporting documents, in-
cluding petitions, verification certificates, and the revenue
record. There simply was not enough space on the list to
document who had added a particular entry on what docu-
mentary grounds. Official procedures called for review and
approval of the lists by the more senior officials, but this was
impractical given the volume of documents that would have
had to be seen for verification of the hundreds of entries on
even a single list. Furthermore, in many cases, such docu-
ments were hard to locate because they had been mislaid
or removed from the office altogether. In terms of Latour’s
concept of “circulating reference” (1999:24), the list lay at
the end of a chain of transformations, transmutations, and
translations that links a representation to its purported ref-
erent. Tracing entries on the list back along this chain to
their supposed referents was difficult, if not impossible. The
compensation lists, therefore, were relatively autonomous
(decontextualized, in Goody’s terms), weakly linked to the
process that was supposed to generate them.17
This characteristic of lists opened them up to rather
easy manipulation. When a list was being prepared, an en-
try could simply be added, without the difficult (and ex-
pensive) effort of fabricating supporting documents, which
would have involved other functionaries. Because signs of
the process by which the list was actually produced were not
inscribed on the list itself, functionaries could evade pre-
scribed procedures and open the list preparation process
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to “outside” parties.18 In practice, lists were produced by a
variety of irregular activities in the murky transactional are-
nas of money, favors, friendship, and kinship. They gradu-
ally came to resemble Tchichikof’s registers of dead souls
(Gogol 2004), except these souls were living—elsewhere.
When a list was approved by senior officials, fraudulent
entries were secured. Common recognition of the practical
difficulty of thoroughly verifying the lists relieved the ap-
proving officials of much of their responsibility. Senior of-
ficials, some of whom had also added fraudulent entries,
could approve the lists with the certainty that false entries,
if discovered, would be evidence of managerial incapacity,
rather than criminality. But the lists sometimes betrayed
affectees and their partners as well. As lists were being fi-
nalized, the CDA often received letters alleging that many
of the names on them were fraudulent. These letters were
usually submitted by one faction of the village against the
fraudulent (and even genuine) claims made by other fac-
tions. Documents gave rival factions a new way to feud. Al-
though it could not verify these claims, the CDA found it
difficult to go forward with compensation proceedings af-
ter receiving allegations of fraud.
Such complications have driven the disputes into the
courts. The CDA has fought the BQB case and others like
it to the Supreme Court of Pakistan—with no success. In
court too, the CDA has been betrayed by its own records. In
postcolonial Pakistan, as in the British Indian colonial state,
government records have a powerful official presumption
of truth, despite the widespread knowledge that they are
routinely manipulated. In official ideology, the validity of
records (or, more precisely, their referential correctness) is
ensured by following the procedures established for their
production. Courts have been unsympathetic to factual
claims by the CDA that the house counts simply did not
square with earlier census data on the area or with the pos-
sibilities of biological reproduction. For the courts, even
physical evidence from later CDA site inspections showing
the houses never existed paled in comparison to the mass
of previous documentation testifying to their existence.
The courts required the CDA to show convincingly that
the impugned documents were not produced according to
correct procedures, which the CDA could not do. The CDA
has even lost in court when it has impugned its own records
with the testimony of the DC–CDA, ADT, and subengineers,
all of whom have declared in depositions that they signed
none of the hundreds of CDA documents that appear to
bear their stamps and signatures. These claims are almost
certainly false, but they are made defensible by the rumored
existence of a forgery ring specializing in Land Directorate
signatures. But the CDA investigations that attempted to
trace documents through the actual process by which they
were produced—to identify documents with individuals—
were not enough to disqualify the documents, for they had
risen to the level of corporate or collective authorship (Hull
2003). In their circulation, the documents had received nu-
merous signatures other than those of CDA functionaries
accused of perpetrating the fraud. These documents were
the contemporary equivalent of what diplomatic historians
call “chancery forgeries,” that is, forgeries produced by the
same social process as genuine documents, with the ex-
ception of correct reference; they are authentic but false
(Petrucci 1995:247).
The National Accountability Bureau (or, as it is frankly
known, NAB) brought this fraud to public view in 2000 and,
with the summary authority of the new military govern-
ment, stopped the payments on remaining claims. But the
BQB settlement continues to grow as officials and the courts
try to sort genuine from “fake” (Dawn 2000) awardees.
Transparent solutions
Today, some officials, like the special magistrate I quoted
in the beginning of this article, see the solution to this
predicament in the more effective deployment of the bu-
reaucratic techniques that have failed the organization so
thoroughly. Veterans of the dispute, however, are more pes-
simistic about the prospect of resolving the issue through
more secure and more accurate documentation. They rec-
ognize the strength of the collective of artifacts, affectees,
corrupt functionaries, and, now, courts. In 1993, a commit-
tee headed by a CDA official with an unassailable reputation
for honesty and long experience in the Lands Directorate
was formed to investigate fraudulent compensation claims
in the G–11 to G–12 area, including BQB. After reviewing the
documentary evidence, the committee attempted to con-
duct site inspections to measure land holdings and enu-
merate and measure houses. As on other similar occasions,
the residents of the settlement met the CDA inspectors with
guns and barred them from the site. Because the ostensible
referents of the records were inaccessible, the committee,
like the affectees, focused on the records themselves.
One finding of the committee’s confidential English-
language report was that the fraudulent award had it-
self become a genre. The report noted that the fraudu-
lent awards were almost identical in terms of their prose,
down to the central vague, idiosyncratically ungrammati-
cal justification for accepting petitions for compensation:
“The houses of the petitioners were missed from the rel-
evant award due to some mistake/overlook.” The report
concluded that “the current chaotic situation is a direct re-
sult of the lists of residents prepared from time to time. In
each successive list, the number of affectees increased in
a manner which defied the laws of mathematical progres-
sions.” Recognizing that the CDA had lost control of the
bureaucratic process through which records are generated,
the committee warned that the “preparation of fresh survey
lists will compound the current complicated situation.” In
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a startling finding, the committee strongly advised that
there be no more investigations and, especially, “no fresh
lists.” The committee recommended that current claims, al-
though largely fraudulent, be paid as soon as possible, be-
cause continued efforts to dispute them would only result
in more legally incontestable claims. The committee recog-
nized that written materials were the artifacts around which
collusive networks of staff, officials, and brokers formed. To
break these networks, the artifacts would have to be dis-
pensed with.
Bureaucratic semiotic technologies are usually de-
scribed as the means by which government dominates
the populace. In this case, these technologies have been
turned against the government. CDA officials pursuing the
interests of the CDA have been forced to renounce them.
Many officials no longer consider lists, maps, or prop-
erty records useful for the resolution of expropriation dis-
putes. For a brief period, one financial officer even refused
to sign his department’s checks to disburse court-ordered
compensation.
In his excellent study of the consequences of British-
colonial land-registration practices in India, Richard
Saumarez Smith writes, “Reduction of field patterns to
paper lay at the heart of the new idiom of the records, the
new works of reference which could only be consulted
individually, serially, and according to the procedures laid
down by the Government: the venue for settling points of
information, and of dispute, was transferred from the open
fields to the closed courtroom” (1996:252). In contemporary
Islamabad, the venue for settling points of information and
of dispute remains the courtroom, rather than the open
fields, but the government does not control the records
carried out of the fields and into the courtroom. If, as
Saumarez Smith writes, the British “ruled by records,”
today, the CDA is ruled by records.
Although the CDA continues to struggle to gain pos-
session of the land it has already paid so much to acquire,
in 1993 it rezoned nearly a third of the Islamabad territory
slated for government development under the original mas-
ter plan. This land has now been left to private corporations
and housing societies to develop, which are faring no better
than government planners in wresting land from villagers.
It is likely that much of western Islamabad will develop
from existing villages and resemble the “organic growth”
of Rawalpindi so vilified by Doxiadis. The future lanes and
streets of this urban area will almost certainly follow the
banks, footpaths, and property lines that have long divided
the agricultural fields of the region.
The expropriation process is the most dramatic exam-
ple of official attempts to curtail documentation, but there
are others. To prevent ownership disputes and sales of plots
in the redevelopment and regularization of one squatter
settlement, the CDA refused to provide titles or any other
documentation of plots. Instead, the plots were awarded to
people in public ceremonies of ostensive reference. Officials
pointed out to each allottee a plot outlined and numbered
in chalk and publicly pronounced the plot to be his or hers.
The only government documentation the new owners re-
ceived was a large sign fixed in concrete at the entrance to
the development that listed their names and plot numbers
in Urdu. An official list of allocations was kept under lock
and key by the deputy director in charge of the project. An-
other instance relates to mosques. The illicit distribution
of planning maps showing the future layout of new sec-
tors has fueled sectarian conflicts and altered the relation-
ships between mosques and residential settlements. Sectar-
ian groups, with surveyors in tow, locate planned mosque
sites in empty fields and take possession of them through
regular prayer broadcast through loudspeakers. To prevent
this practice, planners have begun to disguise mosque sites
on new CDA drawings as schools (Hull in press).
However, such efforts to reduce the role of graphic ar-
tifacts have been ad hoc and limited. Initiatives for sys-
temic change have faced determined opposition. This is il-
lustrated by the fate of an expensive computer system the
CDA acquired to run an electronic database of property
holdings in the city. The dispirited manager of this idle sys-
tem complained that no one would give him any informa-
tion to put into it. Departments refuse to surrender infor-
mation to the electronic records division, as they are loath
to disrupt the relations of influence and the system of il-
legal payments organized through files and other paper
artifacts.
Islamabad is the most highly regulated city in Pakistan.
Yet the CDA might be, as one former chairman described
it to me, “the most corrupt government division in the
country.” In Islamabad, as elsewhere, the paper basis of reg-
ulation is widely recognized as central to activities charac-
terized as corruption. This recognition has fueled recent ini-
tiatives within both India and Pakistan for “e-governance.”
Discussion of electronic government systems is saturated
with the theme of “transparency,” the watchword of a broad
movement against state corruption supported by states, in-
ternational institutions such as the IMF and World Bank,
multinational corporations, and NGOs.
The deployment of electronic information systems as
an anticorruption measure can be seen as a development in
the line of signatures and stamps. The goal is to broaden the
role of physical causation within the bureaucracy, to give ar-
tifacts greater agency in the human affairs of government.
Eyes, minds, and hands are to be replaced by scanners,
computers, and printers in an attempt to restrict the hu-
man role in referential practices to interpretation only. The
promise of such electronic documentation to curb corrup-
tion remains uncertain. Historically, new communications
technologies have supplemented and transformed, rather
than replaced, older ones, as, for example, the “delay” in
the arrival of the paperless office indicates. Furthermore,
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electronic forms of representation build historically on dis-
course genres, means of distribution, and concepts of au-
thorship and ownership that were developed through the
medium of paper. An understanding of paper practices en-
ables recognition of both the genuine novelty and the con-
tinuity of electronic technologies that are obscured by the
rhetoric of technological revolution. My account of the ex-
propriation process in Islamabad suggests that insofar as
transparency is pursued through intensified paper docu-
mentation, the result can be an opacity created by more
tangled and broken chains of reference.
Transparency is an ideal that can undercut itself in
practice. As political projects of civil society, transparency
initiatives are attempts to turn the modernist regime of
surveillance on government itself, not only to see the state
but also to see like a state. The proponents of transparency
strive for an immediate relation between representations
and objects, even while their efforts to establish this relation
reveal it to be a contraction of a complex series of discur-
sive and material translations, for example, between marks
on paper and a house in an expropriated village. It has be-
come a commonplace of science studies that the workings
of a machine are often ignored and poorly understood un-
til the machine begins to act in unpredictable ways. Sim-
ilarly, this extraordinary story of government has much to
say about its common functioning. Veena Das (2004) and
Emma Tarlo (1997) both describe situations in which state
power is strengthened by the manipulation of documents.
My point, therefore, is not to link manipulation of docu-
ments with any particular project or kind of actor. Rather,
I aim to show that, between state representations and their
objects, there is no ontological gap (Latour 1999) but com-
plex series of transactions among people and things that are
basic to routine government.
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1. Used by government officials, the term expresses the author-
itarian power of state institutions; it is invoked by the subjects of
that power as a moral claim against it.
2. A graphic ideology can be seen as a particular form of what
Webb Keane (2003) describes as a “semiotic ideology,” which de-
fines what counts as a sign and how signs are understood to func-
tion in the world.
3. Jeremy Bentham (1932), to cite one of the earliest proponents
of an organization of institutions that people now call “bureau-
cratic,” based his proposals for efficient collective action on a thor-
oughgoing individualism and nominalism that denied the reality of
all but individual persons, acts, events, and experiences.
4. With a few exceptions, I quote from “active” files, written on
by current officers and staff members of the CDA and Islamabad
Capital Territory Administration (ICTA). As I describe below, files
are normatively confidential and inaccessible to anyone not part of
the official bureaucracy. However, before I realized it, I fit into the
very networks of informal circulation of files that I was studying. Al-
though I have full documentation for the writers, dates, and official
file numbers of the files I quote, I do not include this information in
the references for two reasons. First, publishing reference informa-
tion might expose the writers or those who kindly gave me access
to the files to charges of wrongdoing as their actions or writings are
recontextualized in a public forum. Second, although the lack of
identification of these sources may lessen the scholarly authority
of my account, such identification would, in any case, not serve the
usual function of providing others with the possibility of evaluating
my work in light of the actual sources. The active files I examined
are never likely to find their way to “the archive,” and many of the
inactive files were, unfortunately, destroyed after I read them.
5. Those who were granted lands in other areas of Punjab often
faced harassment from residents in those areas who tried to pre-
vent them from farming the new land to pressure them to sell the
land cheaply.
6. Although the CDA, under the Cabinet Division since 1981, has
its own small police force, it relies for larger operations on the forces
of the ICTA, which is part of the Interior Ministry. As might be ex-
pected, relations between the ICTA and the CDA have often been
rocky. There has been little coordination between the two organi-
zations, and the ICTA chief commissioner and the CDA chairman
have often not been on speaking terms. The ICTA frequently refuses
CDA requests to provide it police support. The ICTA also frustrates
the regulatory efforts of the CDA by issuing so-called No Objection
Certificates (NOCs)—documents approaching permission—for ac-
tivities the CDA prohibits. Because chains of command of the two
organizations converge only at the level of the prime minister, such
disputes often go unresolved.
7. The obvious solution—to acquire both sectors over which a
village spreads—would push the problem to the border of the next
sector, where a different village would be bifurcated by the sector
border. The problem could be minimized by acquiring all the sec-
tors at once, thus reducing the number of villages straddling sec-
tors. However, money for compensation is generated by the sale
of developed plots, so there would not be enough funds for such
a comprehensive acquisition. Furthermore, the master plan called
for the city to expand indefinitely, so total acquisition is theoreti-
cally impossible as well.
8. In the 1980s, the number of claims increased as exponentially
as the land values of Islamabad. Doubts that the new capital might
not fly disappeared with the break-off of East Pakistan and the for-
mation of Bangladesh. Nevertheless, through the 1970s, Islamabad
remained a rather small, empty city, populated almost exclusively
by government functionaries unlucky enough to have been moved
up from Karachi. In the early 1980s, several factors made the city
more popular and sent land values spiraling upward. The Afghan
war brought the prosperity of a profitable export market and the
lucre of U.S. civil and military aid, which entered the Pakistani
economy in many forms, legal and illegal. The drug trade flour-
ished as Pakistan and the United States looked the other way in
the interest of financing the mujahideen campaign against the So-
viets. The Iran–Iraq war brought Iranian businessmen looking for
a secure base of operations. Finally, Islamabad offered a secure, if
dull, haven to wealthy Pakistanis escaping the growing violence in
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Karachi. As market values increased, so did villagers’ unwillingness
to part with their land, which accelerated the inflation created by
growing demand.
9. The Planning Wing has faced this problem more squarely in its
resettlement of squatters in G–8, who are being awarded developed
plots on the site of their current settlement. Possession of a house
in the current settlement entitles the possessor to a developed plot.
The awards of plots are based on a rigid physical definition of the
house as a four-walled enclosure with a single door, and the CDA
adjudicates competing claims of occupants to the award of the plot.
This definition, of course, has led to the rapid proliferation of walls
and doors!
10. The new definition became “the affectee, his or her spouse
and unmarried children at the time of acquisition” (Capital Devel-
opment Authority 1996).
11. The very title for headman, an English–Persian hybrid, points
to the inadequacy of the term tradition to capture the peculiar re-
lation such figures have had to state authority under the colonial
and postcolonial states. The most spectacular beneficiary of the
expropriation process is probably the current pir (hereditary spir-
itual and temporal leader) of the Golra Sharif shrine. A descen-
dant of the first pir and considered a saint by devout followers, the
current rather worldly pir has enriched himself through extensive
land dealing and favorable CDA land exchanges and compensa-
tion packages. His strong influence within the bureaucracy has also
strengthened his influence over residents of the area.
12. Similar newspaper accounts of these events can also be
found in Muslim 1988, and Nawa-i-Waqt 1988.
13. Reza Sajjad is a pseudonym.
14. Approach is a term of South Asian English referring to the
ability to access influential people. Wala is a generative Hindi–Urdu
suffix that can be added to almost any lexical unit to form a noun
indicating a person who possesses something or does the action
conventionally associated with the referent of the lexical unit.
15. See the anonymous fictional account Revelations of an Or-
derly (Khan 1866) for a British view of how effectively even such
lowly staff could shape bureaucratic activities during the colonial
period.
16. He was later convicted of illegally allocating plots to friends,
relatives, and himself. However, he was never charged for the much
more remunerative activities under discussion here.
17. Of course, the lists are not “decontextualized” in the broad
semantic sense that this term is sometimes used. That is, their sig-
nificance does depend on the context of use.
18. This unique capacity of the list was recently highlighted in
congressional hearings on the firing of U.S. attorneys by the Bush
administration’s Department of Justice. Here is Senator Diane Fein-
stein questioning Attorney General Alberto Gonzales:
I may be very slow. But I don’t understand how this list was
compiled. . . . Kyle Sampson, your former chief of staff—I’m
going to talk about the senior so-called leadership of the
department—and the person you said you delegated this task
to testified that he didn’t put people on the list. He said, quote,
“It wasn’t like that. It wasn’t that I wanted names on the list.
I was the aggregator.” That’s page 184 of his transcript. Mike
Battle, director of the Executive Office of the United States At-
torneys, said, “I had no input. Nobody asked me for my input.”
That’s the interview, page 82. Bill Mercer, acting associate at-
torney general and number three at DOJ, said, “I didn’t under-
stand there was a list. I didn’t keep a list. It was just that any
time I had a particular concern, I made that known to different
people.” And you testified this morning that you didn’t know
the reasons U.S. attorneys were put on the list until after you
decided to fire them. . . . And to this time, we do not know who
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